Breaking the Back of Unconstitutional Rate-of-Development Ordinances in the Florida Keys

Enacted in 1992 as a "hurricane evacuation infrastructure deficiency" moratorium -- that would expire in 2002 -- every local government in the Florida Keys now has a permanent Rate-of-Development (ROD) ordinance. And those same governments have stalled, and openly opposed, the infrastructure improvements that were going to be completed by 2002. Of course, the got-miners oppose any and all infrastructure improvements, and the local governments gladly appease them. The hurricane evacuation rationale has morphed into a sewer infrastructure deficiency, a save-the-trees program, and an endangered species program, protecting endangered rats, snakes, Playboy bunny, and midget Virginia white-tailed deer (imported in the 1800's as food).

At some point these ROD ordinances must be unconstitutional as violative of Substantive Due Process. Recently, in Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 813 N.E. 2d 843 (Mass. 2004), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a ROD ordinance -- in effect for 15 years -- was no longer constitutional. Just imagine -- the Town of Hadley had done nothing to cure the "infrastructure deficiency" its ROD ordinance was supposed to alleviate. But it sure reduced development and the got-miners were quite happy.

Sound familiar? Of course. It happens all over the United States, in areas thought to be desirable by the people who live there, as well as those who would like to live there -- and can buy land there but cannot get a building permit. Once someone manages to own their piece of paradise, their highest priority becomes preventing anyone else from doing so.

For an excellent analysis of the problem, see William A. Fischel's "The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land Use Policies," Harvard Univ. Press (2001). The author is an economics professor at Dartmouth College, who previously published "Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics," Harvard Univ. Press (1995).

Last year we filed two lawsuits challenging Florida Keys' ROD ordinances. The first one, Lightner et al. vs. Monroe County & the State of Florida, involves over 1,200 parcels of land on Big Pine and No Name Keys. The other, Evanoffs vs. the Village of Islamorada, targets that town's ROD ordinances. In the latter, the Circuit Court has agreed that the Complaint states a cause of action, and has asked the parties to schedule a trial at the earliest available opportunity. It would appear that we are on the right track.

If a $2 Poll Tax is Unconstitutional, Can a $4,500 Ripeness Fee be Constitutional?

I understand charging a fee for reviewing building plans -- or to process a Conditional Use or Special Exception -- but charging a $4,500 fee to request Just Compensation? The Monroe County Commission may think this is a terrific idea. Why, just think, a $4,500 "ripeness fee" might just keep a lot of those damn, rabble-rousing landowners from asking for "money" for their regulatory taken property.

On December 31, 2008, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal, once again, explained how the Florida Keys' unusual Beneficial Use Determination (BUD) process works. See Collins, et al. v. Monroe County, et al., 999 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008) and Shands v. City of Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008). It is also worth noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court just upheld an almost identical BUD in OFP, LLC v. State of New Jersey, 930 A.2d 442 (NJ App 2007), affirmed, 963 A.2d 810 (NJ 2008). (So we are not alone anymore.)

In 1986, the State imposed a confiscatory zoning map on the Florida Keys. It downzoned at least 5,000 platted lots, making them unbuildable. Until First English in 1987, Florida's position was that confiscatory zoning ordinances were unconstitutional on Due Process grounds. See Dade County v National Bulk Carriers, 450 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1984) (Florida did not recognize a right to monetary compensation for regulatory takings by zoning ordinances.) In 1986, the State planning agency was staring at a major Due Process lawsuit that would have taken down its ComPlan in a heartbeat.

In 1985, along came Charles Siemon. He came up with the State's first (and only) "ripening" ordinance. The 1986 BUD gave the County Commission authority to waive any land use regulation that "took" property. The 1986 language was painfully unconstitutional, as it required the landowner to first "attempt" to sell the property for 40% of its pre-regulation Fair Market Value (FMV). If that failed, and the County declined to waive its regulation(s), the County would pay the landowner 40% of the pre-regulation FMV. Judge Richard Payne struck down both provisions in a regulatory taking lawsuit we filed in 1988. The 3rd DCA affirmed. See Monroe County v. Gonzalez, 593 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1992).

In 1990, we filed another regulatory taking lawsuit, this time against the City of Key West. See Key West v Berg, 655 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3rd DCA), rev. denied, 663 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1995). In 1994, a new Key West ComPlan included a reference to a not-yet-adopted BUD process. Judge Richard Payne agreed Berg did not have to exhaust a not-yet-written regulation, but the 3rd DCA reversed, asking, at oral argument, "why can't you just write the City a letter?" On remand, the City settled with Mr. Berg for $3.5 million.

In 1993, the State of Florida inserted the 1994 Key West BUD language -- which the State also wrote -- into Monroe County's new ComPlan (effective 1977). The County adopted implementing regulations in 1998, and the 1998 BUD ordinance remained in effect until 2008. A new -- but much less constitutional -- BUD ordinance went into effect last year.

The law is clear that a Florida Keys landowner -- who believes their land has been subjected to a regulatory taking -- must petition for a Beneficial Use Determination before his or her taking claim is "ripe." It is equally clear that the Statute of Limitation does not begin to run on a Florida Keys regulatory taking claim until the BUD determination has been rendered. This protects the landowner who is unaware of their claim, and prevents the local government from receiving windfalls when landowners fail to exercise their right to sue for a regulatory taking. It does not protect the government from claims the BUD process has become "futile" on a case-by-case basis.

Last I looked, the right to Just Compensation for a "taking" of property is enshrined in both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions -- just as is the Right to Vote. We don't allow governments to charge a fee for exercising the right to vote -- not a dollar, nor a penny -- even though it costs the government a boatload of money to buy the voting machines, print the ballots, and staff the polling places.

In 1997, Monroe County began charging a $500 fee for processing a BUD petition. Apparently nobody complained, so the fee began to creep up, first to $750, then to $1,300. We filed about 25 petitions the day before the increase to $1,300 went into effect in 2005. Now -- as you can see from the agenda item I posted on Google Docs -- the leeches in the planning department want to increase the fee to $4,490.

For at least the past two years, we have been considering filing a lawsuit to declare the BUD unconstitutional, on several grounds, and to declare the Florida Keys' confiscatory land use regulations unconstitutional on Due Process grounds. What the State and County planners keep forgetting is the holding in Joint Ventures v. Florida DOT, 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990). In Joint Ventures, the supreme court held a legislative act that precludes all development on a parcel of land, is unconstitutional on Due Process grounds, unless the landowner has a direct avenue to condemnation proceedings. The supreme court specifically stated that the right to bring an inverse condemnation proceeding, as FDOT argued, does not suffice. In the end, the FDOT land-freezing statute was declared unconstitutional on Due Process grounds. (Note the similarity to National Bulk Carriers, above.)

None of the 5 or 6 Florida Keys' BUD ordinances provide affected landowners with a right to a condemnation proceeding. All you get is a letter in the mail that includes an offer to buy the property at a price that is about 15% of what one would receive, on average, in a condemnation proceeding. And -- if you turn down or ignore the offer, the government is content to let you rot in Hell forever. That is not Just Compensation, and it violates Due Process big time.

As they say in the advertising business, watch this space.

3rd District Court of Appeal Denied Motions to Remand Beyer, McCole, and Sutton

Despite the fact that the City of Marathon agreed to the remand of Beyer v City of Marathon & the State of Florida, and the County's response to our remand motion in Sutton v. Monroe County was essentially "please make them write a Brief," the Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal denied our motions to remand Beyer, McCole v. City of Marathon, and Sutton in light of the Court's New Year's Eve decisions in Collins v. Monroe County and the State of Florida and Shands v. City of Marathon.

All three of these regulatory taking cases were dismissed on the same statute of limitation ground that was rejected by the same Court in Collins and Shands. The only opposition to our remand motions came in McCole, where the City raised an additional argument below and apparently thinks that argument might be enough to win. So, now we need to write three more Briefs, and have three more oral arguments. And the governments' private-sector lawyers will bill the taxpayers for more attorneys' fees.

Voice of Reason Sent to Every Owner of Undeveloped Tier I Property in Unincorporated Monroe County

Over the next few days, copies of our latest issue of The Voice of Reason should appear in the mailboxes of every owner of undeveloped, Tier I, property in unincorporated Monroe County. Even though we put this issue together a couple of months ago, we had to get it cleared by the Florida Bar as "advertising." The Bar's reviewer took issue with our use of words like "stealing" and "thieves," when referring to the governments of Florida and Monroe County. She suggested we were accusing government of criminal activities for which they should be tried and incarcerated. It hadn't crossed my mind yet, but sounds like a good idea to me!

So we toned down the rhetoric a notch, updated the story on page 4, and uploaded it to be printed and mailed -- by first-class mail. We are working on a modified version to be mailed to the owners of all undeveloped property in Islamorada and Marathon. Fortunately, now that we have been cleared by the Florida Bar with the current issue of The Voice of Reason, we don't have to submit future issues to the Bar for vetting.

Gov't Appeals Collins Decision to Florida Supreme Court

For those who are following the New Year's Eve regulatory taking decisions in Collins, et al. v Monroe County, et al., and Shands v. City of Marathon, let it be known that no stone will remain unturned. Friday, the gov't served notice that it was petitioning the Florida supreme court to review the Third DCA's Collins decision under its discretionary jurisdiction to hear whatever it takes an an interest in. These are uphill battles, but the gov't's notice suggests it has located an inconsistency between the Collins decision, and a decision of another District Court of Appeal.

The Monroe County Attorney's office requested permission, in January 2009, to file this petition for discretionary review. But I could not fathom, from its request to the County Commission, what it was relying on for its argument that the Collins decision "conflicts with the decisions of other Florida District Courts of Appeal." Perhaps the field of regulatory taking law is so far from what these gov't lawyers do on a day-to-day basis, they just don't understand the law.

Anyway, the discretionary review process is constrained by time and space limits. The gov't now has 10 days to serve its 10-page "jurisdictional brief." Then, we get 20 days (plus 5 days for mailing) to serve our response. There is no reply brief, and the gov't petitioners are limited to the words in the District Court of Appeal's opinion (no references to the record before the trial court are allowed). This is a tough one for the government.

Meanwhile, there is no automatic stay at this point. If the gov't wants the proceedings below to be stayed, it must get the District Court of Appeal to enter a stay order. Stay tuned. This is far from over.

California Decision Finding Lucas "Categorical Taking" in 30-Year Moratorium. Sounds Familiar.

I downloaded the 49-page slip opinion in Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes ("Monks II") after seeing it mentioned in the October 1, 2008, inversecondemnation.com blog of Hawaii land use attorney Robert H. Thomas. It came back to me this week, when it was highlighted on the front page of the December 2008 issue of Gideon Kanner's newsletter, Just Compensation, with the exclamation:

"Will miracles never cease? The California Court of Appeal held that a city's moratorium forbidding all construction, and extending over a period of some 30 years, was a taking of property."

For those of us who consider California state and federal courts' interpretations of the U.S. Constitution something to be avoided, the tide seems to be changing out there. In December 2007, in Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, a U.S. District Judge held that the city, in imposing a series of land development regulations, and excavating nearby areas for stormwater drainage -- that converted the property into undevelopable wetlands -- had "taken" the property and was liable for $37 million in Just Compensation.

Now, in Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 167 Cal. App. 4th 263, rev. denied, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 14670 (Cal. Dec. 17, 2008), on its second trip to the Court, an intermediate California Court of Appeal held (and the California Supreme Court declined to review) that a building moratorium that started in 1978 was a permanent, categorical taking (as in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).

This is a well-analyzed opinion that uses Lucas reasoning to conclude that the City's 1978 ordinance imposing a moratorium on the construction of single-family homes in the "vicinity" where landslides had recently occurred. In the earlier trip to the appellate court, that court rejected the City's one-two defense of "it ain't ripe, and besides, the statute of limitations has run." Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (Feb. 23, 2005, nonpublished opinion B172698.) ("Monks I," quoted liberally in Monks II.)

The Monks II opinion focused on the following aspects of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas. The California court's synopsis can be boiled down as follows.

1. The Lucas court rejected the contention that Lucas's property retained some economically beneficial use just because he could go there to picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live in a movable trailer. See 505 US at 1044 (Blackmun's dissent).

2. The Lucas court concluded that the findings of the state legislature were of "no import in deciding the taking issue." The Lucas court held "Any limitation so severe [as to deprive land of all economically beneficial use] cannot be mewly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."

3. "The fact that a particular use has been long engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition.... So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied by the claimant. ... It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on [Lucas's] land; they rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land...." Lucas, 505 US at 1030-31 (majority opinion of Scalia, J.); 505 US at 1052, fn 15 , and 1052-55 (Blackmun's dissent).

4. The government bears the burden of proving that the property owner's intended use is not allowed under state law. "...to win its case South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim that ... 'one must so use his rights as not to infringe on the rights of others.' ... Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found. Only on this showing can the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing." Lucas, 505 US at 1031-32.

Just to bring this home, the State of Florida or the local government would have to show that it could have enjoined the building of single-family homes -- on lots zoned for single-family homes -- in the Florida Keys, under the common law in existence before Florida became a state. No statutes or ordinances enacted after that date would be relevant. If it cannot do that, the prohibition on construction of single-family homes in the Florida Keys -- even if it is only a "moratorium" -- is a Lucas categorical taking.

We would like to also mention that the recent Florida 5th DCA decision in St Johns River Water Management District v Koontz, Case No 5D06-1116 (January 9, 2009),brought to mind the fact that, under the US Supreme Court's Nollan/Dolan decisions, forcing landowners to dedicate land to the government as part of the price of obtaining a building permit, is an unconstitutional exaction and a Fifth Amendment taking.

Wouldn't it be interesting if a group of property owners filed a class action against the County and the State, demanding that all of the ROGO lots "donated" to obtain building permits be deemed "unconstitutional exactions," and requiring the County to commence eminent domain proceedings against every one of those parcels, and to pay the "donor" the Fair Market Value of the "donated" lots. After adjusting for Condemnation Blight, of course, which would kick the Fair Market Value up to 125% of the assessed valuation of nearby, developed, residential lots.

Anyway, those are my thoughts for February 2009. Check back here or on mattsonlaw.com to see how these ideas get transformed into action.