Is FEMA Forcing Monroe County to Pay Millions for Regulatory Takings as the Price of Maintaining Flood Insurance in the County?

On Christmas Eve 2011, the Florida Keys Keynoter published an article entitled "County to Sue FEMA Over Habitat Inspections." One wonders how Monroe County even figured out it had a problem --- even though the Florida Key Deer sued the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1990. 

In that case, the Key Deer, through their human spokesman, sued to prohibit the issuance of federal flood insurance in areas where Key Deer habitat existed. A summary judgment hearing was held, in Key West, on August 25, 1994. I assume the Key West Citizen let the locals know that a bunch of deer were trying to stop development in the Florida Keys. Monroe County, on the other hand, made no effort to intervene in the lawsuit.

Following the hearing, U.S. District Judge Michael Moore entered summary judgment in favor of the Key Deer, and against FEMA, ordering FEMA to "consult with" the USFWS (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service) within 30 days. The agencies were required to determine whether the implementation of FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program [NFIP] was "likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the endangered Key Deer." See Florida Key Deer, et al. v.Stickney, 864 F. Supp. 1222 (DC SD Fla., 1994).

Several people have asked why Monroe County did not move to intervene in the 1990 Key Deer lawsuit. There is a simple answer for this. After the huge changes in land development regulations that Monroe County went through from February 1982 through September 1986, including more than 100 public hearings (or one every two weeks for four years), Florida Keys landowners were worn out. In addition, all the 1990 Key Deer lawsuit sought to accomplish was to require FEMA to "consult" with USFWS. 

In 1990, USFWS was adamantly opposed to FEMA issuing flood insurance policies in the Florida Keys. As time went on, USFWS began to waiver, and it ultimately decided to "work with" FEMA. One could probably look at Washington, DC, politics between 1990 and 2005, and figure out who was doing what to whom, but that is a story for another day (and another blogger).

Nothing much occurred for the next 15 years, until the Key Deer plaintiffs sought, and Judge Moore granted, a permanent injunction against both FEMA and the USFWS. The injunction was to be lifted after the agencies "have complied with the [court's] order." As part of the order, the federal agencies were to provide the court with a list of all the properties in the Florida Keys that are "suitable habitat for the Listed Species." By 2005, the list had grown to eight species: the Key Largo cotton mouse, Key Deer, Key Largo woodrat, Lower Keys marsh rabbit, Schaus' swallowtail butterfly, silver rice rat, Stock Island tree snail, and Key tree cactus. See Florida Key Deer, et al, v. Brown, et al., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (DC SD Fla. 2005), affirmed, 522 F. 3d 1133 (11th Cir., 2008).

Monroe County finally woke up in 2005 -- not because the County was asleep, but because the County was beginning to understand the concept of "regulatory taking" jurisprudence. It frantically sought to become a defendant in Florida Key Deer v. Brown, supra, but Judge Moore rejected the County's effort -- saying it was too little, too late, and that after waiting 15 years to intervene, the County's options had run out. In an attempt to appear meaningful, Monroe County appeared as an amicus in the 11th Circuit's appeal of Judge Moore's 2005 decision.

The future is not clear as to Monroe County. But what is this hullabaloo all about? First, we note that many parts of the United States were denied federal flood Insurance in 1989. These are coastal areas deemed "too sensitive" for development for a variety of reasons, and are in the Coastal Barrier Resource System (CBRS). No Name Key, just east of Big Pine Key, is such an area. There are several other parts of the Keys that were, or almost were, designated as CBRS zones in 1989.

The federal flood insurance program does not reach the CBRS areas, yet those areas continue to be developed, with or without some form of flood insurance. If people want to own a house on a beach, they are in an income bracket in which they can afford to purchase private flood insurance. What difference does it make whether a Federal flood insurance prohibition or a CBRS prohibition prevents private landowners from obtaining inexpensive flood insurance from the federal government? These landowners are going to build anyway.

Monroe County has had a schizophrenic County Commission since 1990 -- which happens to be when the CBRS and flood insurance fiascos started (and I started practicing law here in 1983). The County's latest threat, as County Attorney Bob Shillinger put it, is:

"We'll file suit and seek an injunction to stop [FEMA's request to Monroe County to determine which parcels are located in endangered species habitat]." Why, I am not sure. The County also puts a price tag on the issue, quoting County Administrator Roman Gastesi, stating:

• "the real exposure comes in possible takings cases in which landowners claim they can't build on their land because the County denied use of the land through the Endangered Species Act. They could then sue the County for the value of their land."

Now, I am the first person who would sue the County under Mr. Gastesi's theory, if it made sense. But, these are federal regulations, and they don't actually deprive landowners of anything other than subsidized federal flood insurance -- which is not within the County's purview. On the other hand, I do not pretend to be a genius, and I would be willing to listen to the County's theories. The invitation is theirs to accept or reject.

On that note, I wish everyone a Happy New Year! (And it lies less than an hour away.)

The Galleon Bay Case

During the 1960s, Hannelore and Wolfgang Schleu bought undeveloped land on No Name Key, then linked by a wooden bridge to Big Pine Key. In the late '60s and early '70s, the Schleus, and others, platted two canal subdivisions, Bahia Shores in 1969 and Dolphin Harbour in 1970, with 91 lots in total. The Schleus held on to additional vacant land east of the two subdivisions, 14.5 acres of which were transferred to the Galleon Bay Corporation.

In 1986 - at the request of a commercial fisherman who had an option to buy the 14.5 acres, Monroe County rezoned the Galleon Bay land to commercial fishing village, or CFV, a zoning district that allows both residential development and limited commercial fishing uses. When the fisherman could not obtain a dredging permit from the Dolphin Harbour canal to the 2-acre borrow pit on the Galleon Bay parcel, he let the option expire. At that point in time, the Schleu's daughter began a quest to develop the Galleon Bay land.

This is where we came in - in 1988 - to assist Galleon Bay in obtaining a dredging permit so fishermen could have ingress and egress to the ocean. Even though the state agency responsible for issuing the permit agreed to do so, another state agency - the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) - exercised a then-unheard of state authority, under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, and stated its opposition to the issuance of the dredging permit. What made this particularly galling was the same agency - DCA - had to sign off on the rezoning to commercial fishing village just two years earlier.

After its first fiasco with DCA, Galleon Bay requested a change in zoning to improved subdivision, that Monroe County denied. After all, they had to protect commercial fishing villages even if they had no access to the ocean. Undaunted, in January 1991 Ms. Schleu appeared before the County Commission for a 14-lot plat approval - after giving up 11 of the 25 dwelling units that supposedly came with CFA zoning. The plat was approved, but the DCA stuck its nose into Galleon Bay again. The DCA lodged an appeal of the plat approval with the Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLAWAC), an "agency" comprised of the Governor and Cabinet of Florida.

Still undaunted, Ms. Schleu filed a lawsuit against the Department of Community Affairs, and she filed it in the 16th Judicial Circuit, which consists solely of Monroe County. Circuit Court Judge Richard Fowler strongly suggested the DCA settle with Galleon Bay. And, after numerous conferences and delays, DCA, the County, and Galleon Bay agreed to a reduction in the sizes of the 14 lots, and the Revised Plat of Galleon Bay was approved by the County Commission in April 1994.

From 1991 to 2011, the only development on the Galleon Bay subdivision has been the construction of roads and drainage structures. One lot was exchanged for a loan advanced by a family friend. It is now owned by the government - because she could not build on it.

Galleon Bay went through a (statutory, not common-law) vested rights proceeding in 1998, after which a hearing officer, in October 1998, determined the corporation had invested $578,670 from the date of the first plat approval, January 1991, through April 1998. He recommended the County grant Galleon Bay vested rights to construct 14 homes on the property.

By 1998, the majority of the County Commission were "got-miners" (I've got mine; we don't want any more development). In April 1999, the County Commission rejected both the hearing officer's factual findings - which is a no-no - and his recommended order. In November 2001, Galleon Bay filed a Certiorari complaint against the Monroe County Commission on their vested rights decision. Circuit Judge Richard Payne reversed the County Commission's 1999 decision. See Final Judgment Granting Writ of Certiorari, October 2002. Monroe County appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal, and lost. Monroe County v. Galleon Bay Corporation, 876 So. 2d 569, writ denied, no opinion (Fla. 3rd DCA, 2004).

Meanwhile, in May 2002, Galleon Bay filed a regulatory taking lawsuit against Monroe County. The County third-partied the State of Florida, and Galleon Bay also sued the State after they became a party. Circuit Judge Richard Payne rendered an Amended Order on Liability on January 30, 2006. On April 18, 2006, Monroe County and the State of Florida filed a rather novel, Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the Third District Court of Appeal. The petition is so off-the-wall that I always suggest attorneys read it, if only for laughs. The District Court denied the petition, without oral argument, on June 2, 2006, four days before the jury trial was to begin. State of Florida and Monroe County, 930 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The jury trial on compensation was had June 6-10, and 12, 2006. The jury returned a verdict of $3,000,000.

Galleon Bay's appraiser valued the subject property at $6,000,000, while the government's appraiser valued it at $250,000. Galleon Bay had forcefully argued before, and during, trial that the government's appraiser should not be allowed to testify, as his appraisals were nonsensical. All the jury did was split the difference. Galleon Bay moved for a new trial, which was granted. Order Granting Motion for New Trial. The County and State appealed the new trial order and lost. Monroe County et al. v. Galleon Bay Corporation, 954 So. 2d 1169, per curiam affirmed, (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Circuit Judge Richard Payne retired at the end of 2006, and his successor rolled the clock back to before January 30, 2006, invalidating Judge Payne's January 30, 2006, liability order. In light of the fact that this successor judge also threw out four regulatory taking cases that were in front of him (Collins, Shands, McCole, and Beyer), and he was reversed in Collins, Shands, and Beyer, Galleon Bay filed a motion to disqualify the successor judge, as did Collins, Shands, and Beyer. Galleon Bay's regulatory taking case ended up with Circuit Judge Mark Jones - whose judicial experience is almost exclusively criminal law. Following a four-day bench trial on liability (as Judge Payne's January 30, 2006, liability order had been rescinded), Judge Jones entered an order, on April 27, 2011, dismissing Galleon Bay's regulatory taking case in its entirety. Galleon Bay has appealed that order, and its initial brief is due on January 4, 2012. For those with an interest in these matters, you may wish to read Judge Jones' Final Judgment in Favor of Defendants Denying Claim for Inverse Condemnation.

Twenty years is not the end of it all. There will be more to come.

The Galleon Bay TragiComedy

I cannot explain how a trial judge could enter the judgment that 16th Judicial Circuit Judge Mark Jones rendered in Galleon Bay Corporation v. Monroe County, et al., on April 27, 2011. This is the most extraordinary trial court decision I have ever seen --- and I've seen a lot in my 30 years of practicing law ---  but this one takes the cake.

There is no doubt that Judge Jones is a very good trial judge. But his experience has been dominated by hundreds of criminal cases, where the government rarely loses. Before sitting down to write this blog entry, I pulled a Lexis-Nexis listing of every appellate decision in Judge Jones' career -- from June 11, 1997, through April 20, 2011. In 14 years on the bench, Judge Jones' decisions have been appealed 140 times. But for a few exceptions, he has rarely been reversed in his criminal appeals.

Judge Jones' appellate affirmances at the 3rd District Court of Appeal are impressive, but it is unlikely that his criminal successes will carry over into eminent domain law. He has never had to decide such a case, and nobody should be surprised when this Galleon Bay decision is reversed.

Collins Liability Trial Concluded April 14, 2011

The liability trial in Collins, et al. v. Monroe County & State of Florida, was heard over nine days, from April 4-14, 2011, in Key West. When the Collins case returned to the trial court in 2009, it was ultimately assigned to Circuit Judge Tegan Slaton. Judge Slaton knocked out three of the eleven plaintiffs, and those three plaintiffs have filed their Notices of Appeal. In the nine trial days during April 2011, Judge Slaton heard testimony only on the issue of liability. (A compensation trial -- requiring a jury -- follows a finding of liability.)

Judge Slaton acknowledged a complete lack of experience in regulatory taking litigation -- but he is a copious note-taker. He tasked the parties to submit proposed orders after the trial transcript is available, and expressed hope that he would issue an order before August of this year. The transcript has been delivered, and the proposed orders are due on June 6, 2011.

[Edited May 14, 2011.]

April 4-14, 2011: Finally, a Trial in Collins v Monroe County

[Edited May 14, 2011.] On December 31, 2008, the 3rd District Court of Appeal (DCA) reversed Circuit Judge David Audlin's 2007 dismissal of the 11-plaintiff Collins regulatory taking lawsuit. The Florida Supreme Court denied review July 16, 2009. After some judge-shifting, the liability trial was set by Circuit Judge Tegan Slaton, for April 4-14, 2011. Judge Slaton also dismissed three of the 11 plaintiffs before trial. The Collinses and Magrinis had received building permits -- but only after extensive delays. The Schneider heirs, according to Judge Slaton, "waited too long" to bring their taking claims (no statute of limitation argument here, just "you waited too long."). The Schneider heirs' claims are now being litigated by Greg Riordan, who is two generations removed from Mr. Schneider. These dismissals were appealed and are now before the 3rd DCA.

A Little History: On January 3, 1997, the original 11 Collins plaintiffs started down this path when Mr. Tobin and I filed their petitions for Beneficial Use Determinations ("BUDs"). The 1997 BUD process was effective January 4, 1996. It was written by the Florida Department of Community Affairs (DCA) as part of the Florida Keys 1996 Comprehensive Plan. Technically, the language was adopted -- by rule -- by the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Florida Administration Commission (ADCOM). We would note that the 1996 ADCOM rule was a huge improvement over the unconstitutional BUD process that the County -- and ADCOM -- adopted in 1986. For those who were not involved in the 1982-86 evolution of the first ADCOM Florida Keys Comprehensive Plan, it is worth reviewing the 1986 BUD regulation to understand why landowners did not utilize the 1986 BUD to obtain compensation for the loss of all beneficial use of their land.

The 1986 BUD rule/regulation [this, too, had to be approved by ADCOM] required landowners whose property was unbuildable to: (1) make a "bona-fide attempt" to sell their post-1986 unbuildable property for no more than 40% of its pre-1986 Fair Market Value ("FMV"), and (2) if they found no buyers, these property owners would, at best, be entitled to compensation that would not exceed 40% of the land's pre-1986 FMV. The 1986 BUD rule/regulation was declared unconstitutional by Circuit Judge Richard Payne, in Gonzalez v. Monroe County, a lawsuit we initiated in 1988. Judge Payne's decision was affirmed by the 3rd DCA, with an opinion, in Monroe County v. Gonzalez, 593 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

Ultimately, between 2002 and 2004, each of the Collins plaintiffs received a resolution, from the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners, stating that they had been "denied all beneficial use" of their subject properties. In 2004, they sued Monroe County for the just compensation they were entitled to under the United States and Florida Constitutions. On November 6, 2006, then-Chief Circuit Judge Richard Payne denied the County's and State's motions for summary judgment on liability. Unfortunately, Judge Payne was about to retire as of December 31, 2006, and this case was automatically assigned to newly-elected Circuit Judge David Audlin on January 1, 2007.

Judge Audlin turned out to be the governments' greatest ally in 2007. After assuming the Circuit Judge seat left vacant by Chief Circuit Judge Richard Payne, David Audlin swept all regulatory taking cases off his docket within a year! Needless to say, we spent many months on the Audlin appeals. We sucessfully reversed Judge Audlin's dismissals in Collins v. Monroe County and Beyers v. City of Marathon. At the same time, Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF") successfully reversed Judge Audlin in Shands v. City of Marathon. [We are in the process of taking over PLF's responsibilities in Shands v. City of Marathon, while PLF focuses on appellate practice.]

So far, we have not been successful in reversing Judge Audlin's decision in McCole v. City of Marathon, nor Judge Garcia's decision in Sutton v. Monroe County. We believe these appeals were wrongly decided by the 3rd District Court of Appeal, but there are no longer any Florida courts in which we can continue these battles. There is a possibility, having exhausted State judicial remedies, that the Sutton and McCole cases can now be brought in a United States District Court under the United States Constitution. [At least U.S. trial judges do not have to worry about re-election.]

Happy New Year

Well, it has been almost a year since I updated the Grand Theft: Property Blog. So a brief review of our regulatory takings cases in the Florida Keys appears to be in order.

I should point out that, in 2009, we spent about six months getting our Collins and Galleon Bay regulatory taking cases out of the hands of a pro-government trial judge, David Audlin. Judge Audlin had dismissed four regulatory taking cases in 2007 -- Collins v Monroe County, Shands v City of Marathon, McCole v City of Marathon, and Beyers v City of Marathon -- and Judge Luis Garcia dismissed a fifth case, Sutton v. Monroe County. On December 31, 2008, the Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal reversed Judge Audlin's dismissals of Collins and Shands -- but that still left McCole, Beyer, and Sutton to be decided.

The 3rd District Court of Appeal (3rd DCA) affirmed Judge Garcia's dismissal of the Sutton case on December 23, 2009. We were surprised by the 3rd DCA's decision because it was completely contrary to the Collins and Shands decisions of a year earlier. We filed a Motion for Rehearing in Sutton. That was denied May 25, 2010. We then filed a Petition for Discretionary Review with the Florida Supreme Court. That petition was denied on December 18, 2010 -- less than two weeks ago. There are some other options available to Mrs. Sutton, but I will leave that for another day.

The 3rd DCA's decision in Beyers v. City of Marathon, on June 9, 2010, was consistent with its earlier decisions in Collins and Shands, and the Beyer case was remanded to the trial court. However, the 3rd DCA rejected the McCole v. City of Marathon appeal on April 21, 2010, based upon its logic in the Sutton appeal.

This left us with successful appeals in Collins, Shands, and Beyers, but with completely contradictory decisions in Sutton and McCole. Because of the conflict, we filed petitions for discretionary review, in Sutton and McCole, before the Florida Supreme Court in mid-2010. Two weeks ago, on December 18, 2010, the Florida Supreme Court denied review in Sutton and McCole.

The only fact that distinguishes Sutton and McCole from Collins, Shands, and Beyers, from Sutton and McCole is that Ms. Sutton and the McColes "asked" if they might be able to develop their property many years ago, and were told that it was "unlikely" that they could do so. Neither Ms. Sutton nor the McColes requested a Beneficial Use Determination after being told development was "unlikely." In our opinion, this does not rise to the level of "ripeness" required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Williamson County. For that reason alone, we believe the Sutton and McCole decisions are wrong.

Ms. Sutton's and Ms. McCole's remedies are somewhat limited. Both can file regulatory taking claims in Federal court now that they have "exhausted State judicial remedies." The 3rd DCA, in a footnote, also invited Ms. Sutton to file a new building permit application. This, too, is an option.

It is fair to say that the status of regulatory taking claims in the Florida Keys remains somewhat unclear, even where the landowner has only informally sought a development order or building permit more than four years ago. At least this appears to be true in the minds of the appellate judges in Miami. Perhaps a Federal District Court decision to the contrary will change their minds.

In short, that's what we've been doing this past year. We are also moving forward on the Collins case, which is set for a liability trial in April 2011, and on the Galleon Bay case, another lawsuit that Judge Audlin screwed up during his reign in 2007. But ... more on those cases later this year.

When will the Government Figure it Out?

Three weeks ago, the State of Florida deposited $8.85 million with the Clerk of Court for Monroe County to compensate the landowners in Florida DEP v. West for the condemnation of their North Key Largo properties in April 2004. When this eminent domain action was filed as a slow-take in 1995, the State offered a mere $160,000 for the subject properties. Our response to the slow-take was a regulatory taking counterclaim. That was our way to protect landowners from the State "walking away" from any jury verdict it did not like.

Land values began to rise in 2001 -- although not on these properties. In 2004 the State opted for a "quick-take." At that time, the State's estimated fair market value of the two parcels -- based on the confiscatory regulatory scheme -- was $630,000. But after executing the quick-take, the State could no longer walk away from a jury verdict that exceeded its budget. After all, nobody had been able to build on North Key Largo since February 8, 1982 (except at the Ocean Reef Club and a few existing subdivisions).

After the 2004 quick-takes, we re-cast the regulatory taking counterclaim into a jury instruction on condemnation blight. Even though the Florida Supreme Court has embraced condemnation blight on at least two occasions, the State's in-house attorneys could not grasp the concept. Fortunately we had a trial judge, Luis Garcia, who understands government cannot prohibit a landowner from using his property, and then benefit from its own actions by driving down the property's acquisition cost. (In 2001, Judge Garcia ruled the same way in another case, Shadek v Monroe County, where White & Case attorney Doug Halsey raised the same issues and Monroe County settled by paying $6 million in temporary taking damages.)

So ... the government goes down for the count again! I have remarked, on numerous occasions, that the reason for this waste of money is nothing more than the "tyranny of the majority" in small, attractive, relatively well-to-do communities such as the Florida Keys. Those who already own homes in the Keys will do everything in their power to prevent others from doing so. To that end, the "got-miners" elect like-minded County Commissioners, who respond by prohibiting new development wherever they find it. It's a self-perpetuating, downward spiral, that could well -- unless reversed -- bankrupt every owner of developed property in the Keys.

To got-miners: think about it!

Is the State Conceding its "Condemnation Blight" Battle in the Florida Keys?

Last Wednesday, December 2, 2009, the Third District Court of Appeal denied the State of Florida's Motions for Rehearing & Conflict Certification in the "condemnation blight" case, Florida DEP v. West, et al. (original opinion affirming trial court), Case No. 3D08-3185. Two days later, on December 4, 2009, the State's trial/appellate counsel asked us to pick a date in January for the State to write the checks in this case.

This suggests the State decided not to seek discretionary review from the Florida Supreme Court -- a wiser decision than their last one in Collins v. Monroe County & the State of Florida. But, in Collins, the State and County did not face the prospect of incurring almost $2,000 per day in interest costs, so they could waste the landowners' time and money at will.

For those considering a "condemnation blight" attack on value-reducing land development regulations, consider the following. The State deposited $550,000 for Parcel 1 and $80,000 for Parcel 7, as its "good faith" fair market value estimates, in April 2004. The 2008 jury verdicts were $5,060,000 (Parcel 1) and $450,000 (Parcel 7) -- based on the April 2004 real estate market. These verdicts were 9.2 times (820% over) and 5.625 times (462.5% over) the 2004 "good-faith" estimates.

The October 8, 2008, judgments included interest from 2004, bringing the just compensation values to $6,908,114 and $599,142, respectively, or $7,507,256. Presuming the case can be resolved by January 15, 2010, the State's appeal will add $682,398 in additional interest to the landowners' awards -- bringing their compensation up to $8,189,654, or 13 times the State's 2004 "good-faith" estimates (or, if you like your numbers inverted, the good-faith estimates were only 7.7% of the condemnation award, with interest).

Landowners' Condemnation Blight Judgments Affirmed

Today, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgments in Florida DEP v. West, et al, awarding nearly ten times the State's "good-faith" deposits when it condemned two North Key Largo properties in 2004. The trial (and chief) judge, Luis Garcia, should be pleased with his decision to require the jury to consider the "highest and best use" of these properties as of February 8, 1982 -- the last day they were "buildable" -- but valued in the 2004 real estate market.

Judge Garcia found, on the testimony of two former County Commissioners from the early 1980's, and from the voluminous paper trail, that Monroe County was made an "offer it couldn't refuse" in 1982, and again in 1986, and so on until the present day. Former Governor Bob Graham got his conservation land back in '82 ... but these landowners have yet to be paid, in 2009. Though the State DEP could seek "discretionary review" from the Florida Supreme Court, the odds of getting such a review are slim, and the State is running up interest to the tune of $1,468 per day. As of this date, the State's appeal has added $556,247 to the Landowners' compensation (at 11%/year, they should appeal forever).

All in all, this was a good day for those Florida Keys' landowners who have rebuffed the governments' 10-cents-on-the-dollar offers for all these years. For more details, see the West-Freeman section of my website.

(Edited 10/22/2009 to include interest information.)

Casitas Municipal Water District Revisited

On May 10, 2009, I wrote about the Federal Circuit's decision in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, where a local water district has successfully litigated a 5th Amendment taking claim against the United States for diverting water to provide a better life for endangered steelhead trout (and their human and wild predators, one may assume). I noted that the time to file a certiorari petition with the Supreme Court had not run. Well, that time has come and gone, and no petition was filed. The Solicitor General obtained two extensions of time to file the petition. The second extension expired July 17, 2009, and no petition was filed by the United States.

It should come as no surprise that endangered species litigation usually goes to the critters (although sometimes the plaintiffs' motives are suspect, and the public wins). I cannot recollect a taking case where the critters' keepers had to pay just compensation, but I can tick off many where the landowner had to grin and bear it. (Casitas is a physical taking case, so watch out.)

Casitas widens the open door for our class action on Big Pine and No Name Keys, where the Key deer and the Lower Keys marsh rabbits have been handed the keys to more than 1,000 vacant properties by none other than Monroe County, Florida. This confiscatory behavior extends to the rest of the Florida Keys, albeit with a less Draconian flair.

The Federal Circuit's 2-to-1 decision rests on a "physical taking" theory (water, of course), and former Chief Judge Mayer hammered on that point in his "dissent-in-part." Casitas will probably be most helpful in those situations where landowners cannot use any of their property -- thus establishing a Lucas-style categorical (or per-se) taking. What Casitas adds to landowners' quivers is the ability to strip away the mystique that some see when they hear the words "endangered species."

Government Denied Review by Florida Supreme Court in Collins v Monroe County

Yesterday, the Florida Supreme Court denied the governments' petition for discretionary review in Collins, et al v. Monroe County & the State of Florida, 999 So. 2d 709 (2008), rev. denied (Fla. 7/16/2009). The governments' argument -- that Monroe County's Beneficial Use Determination administrative procedure did not trump prior Florida ripeness decisions of the 1st and 4th DCAs -- was without merit. The supreme court saw no conflict between the 3rd DCA's decision in Collins (BUD ripens) and the ripeness decisions in jurisdictions with no BUD (or similar) administrative process.

As Florida's "discretionary review" process is not an "appeal," the 90-day clock for appealing to the United States Supreme Court ran out on May 20, 2009.

The denial of review was rendered only 66 days after the last brief was filed -- which is 26 days quicker that the 92-day average for all review denials in the past 12 months. The result was hardly in doubt. Only 11% of 9,874 petitions for discretionary review were granted by the Florida Supreme Court in the 10 year period 1990-99, and there is no reason to believe anything has changed since the 1990's. If a horse in the Kentucky Derby had an 89% probability of success, a lot of people would bet on it. (Or maybe not, because the payout would be so low.)

As an aside, we note that the supreme court also awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs (landowners).

Condemnation Blight Oral Argument Set

For those who can get to Key West on June 22, 2009, Florida's 3rd District Court of Appeal has scheduled oral arguments that day in Florida v. West, et al., in the new Key West courthouse. This is the 2008 "condemnation blight" decision that required the State to pay ten times its "good faith deposit," in 2004, for two parcels of land on North Key Largo that have been under a development moratorium since February 9, 1982!

Updated May 31, 2009. Please check our website, http://mattsonlaw.com, to read the briefs before you make the trek to Key West. The State's Initial Brief is available, as is our Answer Brief, on the website. The State's Reply Brief is due on or before June 15, 2009.

Ms. Ahearn's $25 Million Eminent Domain Verdict

Gideon Kanner posted this four days ago, about a 101-year old landowner who may have gotten even with the local government. Then the Eminent Domain Law Blog picked it up last Friday, and it's just too good to pass up.

The landowner, 101-year old Ms. Ahearn, had been offered $25 million for her golf course property some 10 years ago, and the local government (Evergreen Park, Illinois) killed the deal by refusing to rezone the property. Then, as luck would have it, the town decided to acquire the property by eminent domain ... offering $5 million. The jury, however, after 30 minutes of deliberation, came back with $25 million -- the amount Ms. Ahearn would have received 10 years ago.

Now comes the difficult part. As in Florida, Illinois apparently allows the condemning authority to "walk away" if it doesn't like the jury verdict. It pays costs and attorneys' fees, but that doesn't do much for the landowner.

We have an analogy to Ms. Ahearn's case here in the Florida Keys -- Florida DEP v West, et al. The West case is pending in the Florida Third District Court of Appeals, after a jury came in at $5.06 million in an eminent domain proceeding where the State put up only $550,000. We represent the landowners in West, and are defending the appeal. But we have a leg up on Ms. Ahearn -- as the State "blinked" and filed a "quick-take" almost at the height of the real estate bubble in 2004. The State of Florida cannot "walk away" on this one.

The State of Florida filed the West condemnation proceeding in 1995, as a slow-take (like Ms. Ahearn's in Illinois). We responded with a regulatory taking counterclaim, figuring the State would run like a scared rabbit if a jury came in at 10 times what the State was offering back then. At the least, the taking counterclaim could be pursued if the State decided to bail out of its slow-take. Fortunately, the State blinked in 2004, and we converted the counterclaim into a motion in-limine on condemnation blight.

Breaking the Back of Unconstitutional Rate-of-Development Ordinances in the Florida Keys

Enacted in 1992 as a "hurricane evacuation infrastructure deficiency" moratorium -- that would expire in 2002 -- every local government in the Florida Keys now has a permanent Rate-of-Development (ROD) ordinance. And those same governments have stalled, and openly opposed, the infrastructure improvements that were going to be completed by 2002. Of course, the got-miners oppose any and all infrastructure improvements, and the local governments gladly appease them. The hurricane evacuation rationale has morphed into a sewer infrastructure deficiency, a save-the-trees program, and an endangered species program, protecting endangered rats, snakes, Playboy bunny, and midget Virginia white-tailed deer (imported in the 1800's as food).

At some point these ROD ordinances must be unconstitutional as violative of Substantive Due Process. Recently, in Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 813 N.E. 2d 843 (Mass. 2004), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a ROD ordinance -- in effect for 15 years -- was no longer constitutional. Just imagine -- the Town of Hadley had done nothing to cure the "infrastructure deficiency" its ROD ordinance was supposed to alleviate. But it sure reduced development and the got-miners were quite happy.

Sound familiar? Of course. It happens all over the United States, in areas thought to be desirable by the people who live there, as well as those who would like to live there -- and can buy land there but cannot get a building permit. Once someone manages to own their piece of paradise, their highest priority becomes preventing anyone else from doing so.

For an excellent analysis of the problem, see William A. Fischel's "The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land Use Policies," Harvard Univ. Press (2001). The author is an economics professor at Dartmouth College, who previously published "Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics," Harvard Univ. Press (1995).

Last year we filed two lawsuits challenging Florida Keys' ROD ordinances. The first one, Lightner et al. vs. Monroe County & the State of Florida, involves over 1,200 parcels of land on Big Pine and No Name Keys. The other, Evanoffs vs. the Village of Islamorada, targets that town's ROD ordinances. In the latter, the Circuit Court has agreed that the Complaint states a cause of action, and has asked the parties to schedule a trial at the earliest available opportunity. It would appear that we are on the right track.

3rd District Court of Appeal Denied Motions to Remand Beyer, McCole, and Sutton

Despite the fact that the City of Marathon agreed to the remand of Beyer v City of Marathon & the State of Florida, and the County's response to our remand motion in Sutton v. Monroe County was essentially "please make them write a Brief," the Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal denied our motions to remand Beyer, McCole v. City of Marathon, and Sutton in light of the Court's New Year's Eve decisions in Collins v. Monroe County and the State of Florida and Shands v. City of Marathon.

All three of these regulatory taking cases were dismissed on the same statute of limitation ground that was rejected by the same Court in Collins and Shands. The only opposition to our remand motions came in McCole, where the City raised an additional argument below and apparently thinks that argument might be enough to win. So, now we need to write three more Briefs, and have three more oral arguments. And the governments' private-sector lawyers will bill the taxpayers for more attorneys' fees.

Gov't Appeals Collins Decision to Florida Supreme Court

For those who are following the New Year's Eve regulatory taking decisions in Collins, et al. v Monroe County, et al., and Shands v. City of Marathon, let it be known that no stone will remain unturned. Friday, the gov't served notice that it was petitioning the Florida supreme court to review the Third DCA's Collins decision under its discretionary jurisdiction to hear whatever it takes an an interest in. These are uphill battles, but the gov't's notice suggests it has located an inconsistency between the Collins decision, and a decision of another District Court of Appeal.

The Monroe County Attorney's office requested permission, in January 2009, to file this petition for discretionary review. But I could not fathom, from its request to the County Commission, what it was relying on for its argument that the Collins decision "conflicts with the decisions of other Florida District Courts of Appeal." Perhaps the field of regulatory taking law is so far from what these gov't lawyers do on a day-to-day basis, they just don't understand the law.

Anyway, the discretionary review process is constrained by time and space limits. The gov't now has 10 days to serve its 10-page "jurisdictional brief." Then, we get 20 days (plus 5 days for mailing) to serve our response. There is no reply brief, and the gov't petitioners are limited to the words in the District Court of Appeal's opinion (no references to the record before the trial court are allowed). This is a tough one for the government.

Meanwhile, there is no automatic stay at this point. If the gov't wants the proceedings below to be stayed, it must get the District Court of Appeal to enter a stay order. Stay tuned. This is far from over.

Time's Up: Local Governments Unable to Find Legal Basis for New Judge's Reversed Decisions

Six days have elapsed since the 15-day deadline ran for filing Motions for Rehearing in the Collins and Shands regulatory taking cases (January 15, 2009). Apparently neither Monroe County (Collins), nor the City of Marathon (Shands), identified errors in the Third District Court of Appeal's reversals of Judge Audlin's dismissals of these cases. The appellate court issued its mandate in Shands v City of Marathon a week ago (January 16, 2009). The mandate in Collins v Monroe County will be delayed slightly, as we filed a Motion for Clarification on January 15, 2009.

As to our Motion for Clarification, we were concerned that the Court of Appeal appeared to believe that the Florida Keys had no zoning regulations until the State imposed them on September 15, 1986. This perception comes from the Third DCA panel opinion in Monroe County v Ambrose, a vested rights case we prosecuted from 1997 to 2003. We asked the current court to correct that misperception. The Florida Keys adopted zoning regulations in 1959 -- the first year Florida's non-charter counties had the right to do so. The County's legal gnomes have until January 25, 2009, to file a response.

We note -- with a taxpayer's curiosity -- that the Monroe County Attorney's office is asking the County Commission for permission to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Florida Supreme Court -- on the condition that the County "will not bear any additional attorneys' fees" for this speculative effort. Give me a break -- if you can't come up with a reason to file a Motion for Rehearing, what makes you believe you can get the attention of the Florida Supreme Court?

We also note -- with a bit more skepticism -- that Monroe County's contract legal "geniuses" from Kansas City and Los Angeles did nothing other than obfuscate the issues in these cases -- in exchange for more than $1.5 million in legal fees. (The same can probably be said for Marathon's outside counsel.) It is amazing how local government officials convince themselves that they will manage to escape culpability from their confiscatory behavior by hiring expensive attorneys from another planet.

Keys Commissioners in Denial

A Monroe County commissioner revealed the County's response to the Collins decision in a radio interview today. They plan to file a petition for review by the Florida supreme court -- no surprise there. But as Florida's District Courts of Appeal are intended to be the courts of last resort, the chance the supreme court will review the Third DCA's decision is zero. Florida's highest court reviews decisions that are (1) certified by a District Court of Appeal as being "in conflict" with another District Court's decision, or (2) certified as a question of "great public importance." (A petition for discretionary review, even by a government entity, does not trigger an automatic stay of the District Court's mandate, though government appeals to the District Courts of Appeal get an automatic stay.)

Option one -- conflict -- is not in play because the Florida Keys' Beneficial Use Determination process only exists in one Florida County -- so no inter-District conflict will ever arise. Option two -- "great public importance" -- is unlikely as well. First, the District Court panel did not use that language in their opinion -- and only the District Court judges can make that call, not the litigants. Second, what makes anyone with a brain think that a confiscatory local government's desire to acquire land for 15 cents on the dollar is of such "great public importance" that it should be continued? It's time to bring this charade to an end.

No word yet on what the City of Marathon plans to do in the Shands case, but Marathon does not have in-house, salaried attorneys as Monroe County does, so a petition for discretionary review would be a bit more expensive. We assume the County will finally terminate its outside counsel from Kansas City, after paying them at least $1.5 million to get to this point.

A skeptic might say that seeking discretionary review by the supreme court just adds to the time it takes for each plaintiff to get paid. Or that it is just a government ploy, hoping that fair market values (which they abhor anyway) might decrease in the interim. But the government owes these plaintiffs rent on their properties, at 10% of their fair market values (appraised assuming that they were buildable on demand) on the date of their Beneficial Use Determination application, and on each anniversary of that date, plus interest, until the government either takes title to the property by eminent domain. At which time it will also have to pay the fair market value as of the date of trial. This is called "rent-to-buy." So the bill keeps going up during these delays.

Bernie Madoff managed to steal $50 billion, for which we all must give him credit -- though it was all quite illegal. His "marks" probably knew something illegal had to be going on, but why worry as long as the checks kept coming? Monroe County and its co-conspirators in State government have been fleecing innocent landowners for more than 15 years, adopting confiscatory regulations that prevent people from using their property -- ostensibly under the banner of the local government. Then, the State government shows up on the doorstep and offers 15 cents on the dollar for your "unbuildable" property. What is this? A "good cop" -- "bad cop" con?

The only aspect of this government con game that is of "great public importance" is stopping the government from stealing innocent landowners' property. If the Collins plaintiffs -- the screwees -- had lost this case at the Third District Court of Appeal, then there might be an issue of "great public importance." As it is, our local "Bernies" deserve their fate.

Collins and Shands Regulatory Taking Decisions Reversed by Third DCA

The Third District Court of Appeal released its REVERSALS of Circuit Judge Audlin's dismissals of Collins, et al., v Monroe County & The State of Florida, and Shands v. City of Marathon, on New Year's Eve -- six months after oral argument. And the opinion is signed by District Judge Suarez -- not Chief Judge Gersten -- so I got that part wrong.

You can read the opinions by clicking on their captions in the previous sentence. You can also view them on the Court's website by clicking on the title of this post. The Collins case number is 3D07-1603; Shands is case number 3D07-3288.

After extensive hearings before Chief Judge Richard Payne after the Collins case was filed in late 2004 -- all favorable to the landowners -- his successor, David Audlin, made it very clear that he was going to get rid of our regulatory taking cases any way he could. He did just that by declaring that the 11 Collins landowners had not sued within four years of the effective dates of the County's confiscatory ordinances. Rescinding Judge Payne's rulings in the landowners' favor -- without even the merest request to do so from the defendants -- Judge Audlin ruled that the County's unique Beneficial Use Determination ("BUD") process did not "ripen" an as-applied taking claim. Following this train of thought, he ruled that the Plaintiffs had not filed their taking claims within the four-year statute of limitation.

On appeal, government counsel (including the County's multi-million dollar lawyers from Kansas City) argued that the BUD process was a meaningless exercise -- despite the fact that this same Court of Appeal had ruled otherwise in one of our earlier cases, Key West v Berg, 655 So. 2d 196 (Fla 3d DCA 1995), and despite the fact that Michael Berg, counsel in the companion Shands case (argued back-to-back with Collins), had successfully convinced the Third DCA in Key West v Berg that a landowner had to go through the BUD process to ripen a regulatory taking claim.

Given their propensity for obfuscation and delay, I guarantee government counsel will move for rehearings in both Collins and Shands -- without success -- and will seek discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court -- which will be denied, in part because the Third DCA's opinions in these cases only affect a single Florida County. So we probably will not be back in the trial court for another six months.

Note added 1/1/09: Judge Suarez' opinions in Collins and Shands suffer slightly from some irrelevant dicta (dicta = statements made by the court that are not based upon the record, nor necessary to the decision in which they appear), perhaps intended to reduce the impact of his opinions on Monroe County's psyche. In particular, we note Judge Suarez' dicta that there were no zoning ordinances in Monroe County before 1986, leading to his suggestion that, just maybe, some landowners who bought before 1986 may have no investment backed expectations. Not only are these remarks outside the record, but they assume an incorrect premise. Monroe County's first formal zoning regulations were adopted on December 8, 1959, and became effective January 4, 1960. Prior to that, there were recorded, platted subdivisions that established residential land use densities as early as the 1920's. While there are times when dicta can be helpful, dicta based on erroneous assumptions are not helpful. We will probably bring this matter before the Court before the opinions become final.

Once the Third DCA denies the governments' motions for rehearing, the Collins and Shands decisions become final. At that point, we expect the Court will remand the Sutton v Monroe County, McCole v Marathon, and Beyer v Marathon cases to the trial court -- as they all suffer from the same wrong logic as Collins and Shands. McCole and Beyer are Audlin dismissals, and were expected. Sutton was dismissed by Judge Garcia, much to our surprise and dismay. There are also some housecleaning issues we need to take care of when these cases come back to the trial courts. Happy New Year, Everyone!

Monroe County Commission Warned State Loss in Condemnation Blight Cases Poses Major $$ Problem

On the Monroe County Commission's agenda for December 17, 2008, is a request from the County Attorney's office for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in the State's appeal of the $6.9 million (plus costs, post-judgment interest at 11%, and attorneys fees) West & Richardson Condemnation Blight judgments. To quote from the request:

On April 9, 2008 - prior to the jury trial on compensation - the trial court entered an "Order Granting Defendants' Motion In Limine on the Issue of Condemnation Blight." The property owners contended that precondemnation actions of the State and County blighted the property by preventing all, or substantially all, beneficial use of the property. The Order prohibited the parties from presenting any evidence regarding the effect of any County or State regulation promulgated, enacted or amended after February 8, 1982. The Order required that the jury be instructed to determine the Fair Market Value of each parcel as of the de jure takings in Spring 2004, according to the highest and best uses they would have had on February 8, 1982.

On October 8, 2008, the trial court entered final judgments awarding just compensation totaling $6,877,257 (plus costs and attorneys' fees). On October 30, 2008, the State of Florida filed Notices of Appeal of the two final judgments. This matter is of great importance to the County because the appellate court's decision will potentially set precedent applicable to the inverse condemnation actions currently pending against the County. In some of those actions, plaintiffs have similarly asserted theories of condemnation blight. The acceptance or rejection of those theories will impact how property is valued for purposes of determining just compensation awards, and either increase or decrease the County's liability exposure.

Other than having an incorrect date for the Condemnation Blight Order (it was April 9, 2007, not 2008), and omitting the fact that the judgments are earning 11% interest per year, we agree that the County could be in deep trouble here -- but so is the State.