Federal Circuit Finds Fifth Amendment Taking by Endangered Species Act

In Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (2008), rehearing denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of Federal Claims -- opinion at 76 Fed. Cl. 100 (2007) -- holding that an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment has occurred.

... there is no doubt that the preservation of the habitat of an endangered species is for government and third party use -- the public -- which serves a public purpose. .... when the government forces Casitas to divert water away from the Robles-Casitas Canal to the fish ladder for the public purpose of protecting the West Coast Steelhead Trout, this is a governmental use of the water.

Every environmental NGO in the country filed amicus briefs in Casitas. Though I haven't read them all, it's just the same old song -- "endangered species are entitled to more Constitutional protection than are citizens of the United States." That just ain't so, and the Federal Circuit has so held.

This brings me to Monroe County's latest fiasco on Big Pine Key and No-Name Key. The County and the State of Florida teamed up to develop a BPK-NNK Habitat Conservation Plan to "protect" the endangered key deer and the Playboy marsh rabbits, that prohibits essentially all use of approximately 1,000 acres of undeveloped, privately-owned land. This confiscatory County/State HCP was submitted to the US Fish & Wildlife Service as part of an application for an Incidental Take Permit. Always happy to accept land donations, the USF&WS issued the ITP -- that recites verbatim the conditions in the County/State HCP.

The problem with this scenario is that the County and the State did not have any ownership interest in the land they donated to the F&WS to "save" the key deer and Playboy bunnies. Ooops? You bet! The only difference between the BPK-NNK HCP and Casitas Mun. Water District v. United States is that Casitas is a physical taking (because the water is physically taken from Casitas and given to the fish) and BPK-NNK is a regulatory taking.

Meanwhile, we have a class action lawsuit pending in state court (Lightner, et al. v. Monroe County and the State of Florida), alleging a regulatory taking of those 1,000 acres on BPK-NNK, that should benefit substantially from this excellent decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

As we see it, the County and State can rescind their confiscatory regulations and pay temporary taking damages to those who have sought development approvals since the regulations went into effect. Or they can pay out more than $200 million in compensation for a permanent taking of 1,000 acres on Big Pine Key and No-Name Key.

PS. The US Court of Federal Claims (CFC) has exclusive jurisdiction over all inverse condemnation claims -- in excess of $10,000 -- brought against the United States. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals hears all appeals from the CFC. Yours truly has been admitted to practice before the CFC since 1985, and the Federal Circuit since 1990.

NOTE ADDED August 10, 2009. The U.S. Solicitor General (Elena Kagan) requested two extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari in Casitas Municipal Water District. The second extension ended July 17, 2009 -- 24 days ago -- and no petition has been docketed by the Supreme Court. Looks like the Casitas battle goes to the property owners.

California Decision Finding Lucas "Categorical Taking" in 30-Year Moratorium. Sounds Familiar.

I downloaded the 49-page slip opinion in Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes ("Monks II") after seeing it mentioned in the October 1, 2008, inversecondemnation.com blog of Hawaii land use attorney Robert H. Thomas. It came back to me this week, when it was highlighted on the front page of the December 2008 issue of Gideon Kanner's newsletter, Just Compensation, with the exclamation:

"Will miracles never cease? The California Court of Appeal held that a city's moratorium forbidding all construction, and extending over a period of some 30 years, was a taking of property."

For those of us who consider California state and federal courts' interpretations of the U.S. Constitution something to be avoided, the tide seems to be changing out there. In December 2007, in Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, a U.S. District Judge held that the city, in imposing a series of land development regulations, and excavating nearby areas for stormwater drainage -- that converted the property into undevelopable wetlands -- had "taken" the property and was liable for $37 million in Just Compensation.

Now, in Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 167 Cal. App. 4th 263, rev. denied, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 14670 (Cal. Dec. 17, 2008), on its second trip to the Court, an intermediate California Court of Appeal held (and the California Supreme Court declined to review) that a building moratorium that started in 1978 was a permanent, categorical taking (as in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).

This is a well-analyzed opinion that uses Lucas reasoning to conclude that the City's 1978 ordinance imposing a moratorium on the construction of single-family homes in the "vicinity" where landslides had recently occurred. In the earlier trip to the appellate court, that court rejected the City's one-two defense of "it ain't ripe, and besides, the statute of limitations has run." Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (Feb. 23, 2005, nonpublished opinion B172698.) ("Monks I," quoted liberally in Monks II.)

The Monks II opinion focused on the following aspects of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas. The California court's synopsis can be boiled down as follows.

1. The Lucas court rejected the contention that Lucas's property retained some economically beneficial use just because he could go there to picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live in a movable trailer. See 505 US at 1044 (Blackmun's dissent).

2. The Lucas court concluded that the findings of the state legislature were of "no import in deciding the taking issue." The Lucas court held "Any limitation so severe [as to deprive land of all economically beneficial use] cannot be mewly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."

3. "The fact that a particular use has been long engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition.... So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied by the claimant. ... It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on [Lucas's] land; they rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land...." Lucas, 505 US at 1030-31 (majority opinion of Scalia, J.); 505 US at 1052, fn 15 , and 1052-55 (Blackmun's dissent).

4. The government bears the burden of proving that the property owner's intended use is not allowed under state law. "...to win its case South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim that ... 'one must so use his rights as not to infringe on the rights of others.' ... Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found. Only on this showing can the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing." Lucas, 505 US at 1031-32.

Just to bring this home, the State of Florida or the local government would have to show that it could have enjoined the building of single-family homes -- on lots zoned for single-family homes -- in the Florida Keys, under the common law in existence before Florida became a state. No statutes or ordinances enacted after that date would be relevant. If it cannot do that, the prohibition on construction of single-family homes in the Florida Keys -- even if it is only a "moratorium" -- is a Lucas categorical taking.

We would like to also mention that the recent Florida 5th DCA decision in St Johns River Water Management District v Koontz, Case No 5D06-1116 (January 9, 2009),brought to mind the fact that, under the US Supreme Court's Nollan/Dolan decisions, forcing landowners to dedicate land to the government as part of the price of obtaining a building permit, is an unconstitutional exaction and a Fifth Amendment taking.

Wouldn't it be interesting if a group of property owners filed a class action against the County and the State, demanding that all of the ROGO lots "donated" to obtain building permits be deemed "unconstitutional exactions," and requiring the County to commence eminent domain proceedings against every one of those parcels, and to pay the "donor" the Fair Market Value of the "donated" lots. After adjusting for Condemnation Blight, of course, which would kick the Fair Market Value up to 125% of the assessed valuation of nearby, developed, residential lots.

Anyway, those are my thoughts for February 2009. Check back here or on mattsonlaw.com to see how these ideas get transformed into action.